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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal is taken from consolidated litigation ansmg from the construction and 
installation of a manure handling system at a Canyon County dairy operated by the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms, LLC (hereinafter referred to as 
"DeGroot"). Beltman Construction, Inc., d/b/a Beltman Welding and Construction (hereinafter 
referred to as "Beltman") was the general contractor for the job. Beltman subcontracted with 
Stan.dley Trenching, Inc., d/b/a Standley & Co. (hereinafter referred to as "Standley") and 
Standley installed the manure handling equipment. 1. Houle & Fils, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "Houle") manufactured the manure handling equipment which was installed at the DeGroot 
dairy. The manure handling equipment worked initially upon start-up but maintenance problems 
arose thereafter. As a resulL DeGroot initiated litigation against Standley and Houle. DeGroot 
then initiated litigation against Beltman and Beltman brought a third party complaint against 
Standley. The later filed actions were consolidated into the initial litigation. 
B. PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
The initial litigation, or DeGroots' direct litigation against Standley, (hereafter referred to 
as the "DeGroot case:') involved DeGroots' filing of a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on 
September 12,2001 against Standley and Houle, alleging claims and causes of action for breach 
of contract, breach of express and implied \varranties, rescission of contract violation of the 
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Idaho Consumer Protection Act, and damages. 1 Thereafter, DeGroot filed a First l\mended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on December 21, 2001, and a Second Amended Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial on May 2, 2003, against Standley and Houle.2 
Standley moved for summary judgment on the claims and causes of action alleged by 
DeGroot in their Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on January 3 L 2005.3 
Standley was granted summary judgment on all claims and causes of action asserted against it 
pursuant to an Order entered March 22, 2005.4 The Order granting summary judgment to 
Standley was further confirmed pursuant to entry of an Order Confirming Summary Judgment 
entered on March 28, 2005. 5 Thereafter, on April 27, 2007, DeGroot moved for reconsideration 
of the Order granting summary judgment to Standley.6 DeGroot's motion to reconsider was 
denied. 7 
Subsequent to the district court's granting of summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's claims, but before Standley obtained sUlID11ary judgment on its Counterclaim, 8 
DeGroot initiated a separate action against Beltman, which litigation was consolidated with the 
DeGroot case after Standley obtained summary judgment on its Counterclaim.9 DeGroot's 
litigation against Beltman consisted of claims and causes of action for breach of contract breach 
1 R VII j" "j . o. , pp. k5-5~. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 33 -46; 65-76. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 111-179 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 374-376 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 377-379 
6 R. Vol. 3, pp. 556-562; R. Vol. 4, pp. 563-607 
R. Vol. 4, pp.765-767 
8 Standley'S Counterclaim was handled by different legal counsel than the attorneys who defended 
Standley against DeGroot's claims. Standley has submitted a separate Respondent's Brief regarding 
the Counterclaim issues on appeal. 
Supp. R., pp. 43-52: 53-55: 67-71 
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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of implied warranties, rescission of 
contract, lliid negligence. Beltman, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial against Third Party Defendants Standley and Houle. lO Beltman alleged claims and causes 
of action against Standley for breach of contract, rescission, breach of warranties, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act. I I Beltman next filed its First Amended Third Party Complaint adding a claim of negligence 
against Standley. Ultimately, Standley obtained summary judgment on the claims DeGroot 
obtained by an assignment from Beltman due to the district court's ruling that DeGroot was not a 
third party beneficiary of the contract between Standley and Beltman. 12 
After Beltman filed its third party action against Standley, DeGroot settled the litigation 
with Beltman and took an assignment from Beltman of its third party claims and causes of action 
against Standley. Standley then filed its third party motion for summary judgment on 
February 2 L 2007.13 Standley's third party motion for summary judgment \vas denied on April 
30, 2007, however, the district court noted in its Order that DeGroot, as assignee of the Beltman 
third party claims, voluntarily \vithdrew the negligence and violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act claims as to all Defendants. 14 Standley next moved for partial summary judgment 
on the claims assigned to DeGroot, except for those claims previously voluntarily withdrawn by 
10 Supp. R., pp. 56 - 66. 
11 Id. 
12 Beltman asserted several of the same causes of action against Houle in its Third-Party Complaint that 
it asserted against Standley. On March 21,2007, Houle moved for summary judgment as to Beltman's 
claims asserted against it arguing as did Standley, that summary judgment was proper given that, as a 
matter of law, DeGroot was not a third party beneficiary of the contract behveen Standley and 
Beltman. The district court entered an Order granting summary judgment in Houle's favor on July 24, 
2007. See R., Vol. 4, pp.740-742 
U R. Vol. 2, pp. 389-391; R. Vol. 3, pp. 392-482 
14 R. Vol. 4, pp. 612-615 
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DeGroot. ls At oral argument, Standley moved to convert its partial summary judgment to a full 
summary judgment and thereafter an Order Granting Standley Trenching, Inc.'s Complete 
Motion for Summary Judgment As to All Claims and Causes of Action Stated In Beltman 
Construction Inc.'s Third Party Complaint was entered on November 8, 2011. 16 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
DeGroot closed on a purchase of real property located in Melba, Idaho, in 1998 that they 
intended to use for a dairy operation milking up to 2,250 COWS. l7 DeGroot obtained a design for 
his dairy and entered into a written contract with Beltman to build the dairy.18 Standley 
subcontracted with Beltman for the manure handling system, \vhich was to be installed as part of 
the dairy construction process. DeGroot did not have any contractual relationship with any 
vendors perfonning subcontract work on the dairy project, including Standley. 19 
Beltman subcontracted vV'ith Standley at the direction of DeGroot. The selection of the 
manure handling equipment manufactured by Houle was made by DeGroot. 20 The total bid 
Standley submitted to Beltman was $233,604.80, of which $174,004.80 was for the equipment 
and $59,600.00 was for the construction of the manure handling system?] Standley'S bid, 
refened to as the "bid contract," was verbally accepted by Beltman and constitutes the primary 
document defining and outlining the work Standley \vas to perform on the dairy project. 22 
15 R \T 1 ~ ~68 76" . '0.), pp. I - .J 
J6 R. Vol. 5, pp. 907-910 
17 R. Vol. 2, p. 208 
lS ld., at p.209 
19 !d., at pp. 209-210 
2C R. Vol. 5, pp. 789 
~~ ld., at pp. 803-806 
R., Vol. 5, p. 793 
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The dairy opened in approximately April of2000.23 DeGroot paid Beltman in full for all 
the work performed on the dairy, including the work by Standley.24 As more cows were moved 
onto the dairy, a dispute arose as to the installation and functionality of the manure handling 
system?5 DeGroot attempted to "revoke its acceptance" of the contract between Beltman and 
Standley in June of 2001. 26 Regarding lack of privity of contract between DeGroot and 
Standley, Charles DeGroot admitted that he did not have a contractual relationship with 
Standley, nor did he provide any plans or specifications directly to Standley.27 Kurt Standley 
also testified that he understood that he was contracting with Beltman, not DeGroot.28 The only 
contract DeGroot entered into for the construction of the dairy was with the general contractor, 
Beltman.29 Other than Beltman's acceptance of Standley's bid on the DeGroot dairy project, 
there is no written or oral contract betiveen Standley and Beltman concerning the work Standley 
was to perforn1 pursuant to its bid submitted to Beltman on the project.30 Charles DeGroot also 
understood that Standley was a subcontractor to Beltman on the project. 3l Standley's work on 
the project installing the manure disposal system started in the summer of 1999 and continued 
through the start-up of the dairy in April, 2000.32 A fundamental component of Standley's bid 
\)"as the use of compost for bedding in the free stalls of the dairy barn.33 However, when the 
23 Jd., at p.788 
24 Jd., at p. 795 
25 Jd., at p. 788 
26 Jd., at p. 809 
27 Jd., at p.210 
28 R. VoL 1, p. 116. 
29 Jd., at pp. 172, 177-178 
30 Jd., at p. 145 
"1 Jd., at p. 172 
:k Id.~ at pp. 174, 177 
:~~ Id.~atp.150 
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dairy began operation in April, 2000 a pit-run mixture of sand and gravel, not compost, was used 
for bedding in the free stalls.34 The sand and gravel was flushed out with the manure and 
interfered with the proper operation of the manure handling system.35 In the first case filed by 
DeGroot, even though there was no contract between DeGroot and Standley, DeGroot sought 
remedies for breach of contract or rescission and other claims against St3..cl1dley (and Houle as the 
manufacturer of the manure handling equipment) rather than against the general contractor, 
Beltman. 
DeGroot argued that it was a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to 
Beltman in an attempt to overcome the lack of privity of contract. 36 Standley's bid contract was 
made to Beltman and does not contain any language showing an intention by Standley or 
Beltman that DeGroot was to expressly benefit from Standley's bid submitted to Beltman. 
DeGroot filed a second lawsuit against Beltman 18 days before the district court granted 
Standley summary judgment on all of DeGroot's claims alleged against Standley in the initial 
litigation.37 
Beltman settled the lawsuit DeGroot filed against it by stipulating to a judgment in favor 
DeGroot in the amount of $964,255.36; however, as Stanley Beltman testified, Beltman did 
not pay any money in relation to the stipulated judgment resolving that lawsuit. Beltman simply 
assigned its rights under its Third Party Complaint against Standley and Houle to DeGroot.38 
Beltman's Third P3..crty Complaint states the exact same claims and causes of action as DeGroot's 
,4 Td 1-4 - 11., at p. ) 
35 Jd., atpp. 146, 154 
36 R. Vol. 3, pp. 556-562 
~~/ R. \'01. 2~ p. 374; Supp. R.~ p. 43 
38 R., Vol. 5, pp. 796: 879 888 
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Second i\mended Complaint.39 DeGroot's' position is that its damages and Beltman's damages 
are the same. 40 Beltman however, is a construction company, not a dairyman operating a dairy. 
Beltman does not have special damages derivative of lost milk production, increased veterinarian 
bills, increased mastitis in the herd, increased mortality rates of cows due to unsanitary 
conditions, or increased labor costs due to operation of the system installed by Standley.41 Nor 
did Beltman incur costs associated with repairing or replacing the system installed by Standley. 
These are all alleged damages that could only be incurred by DeGroot. 
39 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 42 
A. On DeGroot's affirmative claims against Standley: 
1. Vv1hether the district court erred in finding that DeGroot was not a Third Party 
Beneficiary of the bid contract between Standley and Beltman. 
2. 'J"vbether the district court erred in holding that DeGroot could not maintain 
warranty claims against Standley. 
3. wnether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's claims claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
4. wnether the district court erred in grili'1ting summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's claim alleging violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
5. \Vhether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's claim of rescission of contract against Standley. 
B. On DeGroot's assigned claims from Beltman: 
Supp. Rec., pp. 56 - 66 
40 R. Vol. 5, p. 839, p. 898 
41 Jd., at pp. 858-859 
40 The issue of whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Standley on its 
Counterclaim and claim for attorney fees therein is being addressed in a separate Respondent's brief 
by Standley's attorney who handled that aspect of the litigation before the district court. 
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1. \Xlhether the district court erred in dismissing DeGroot's claims as an assignee of 
Beltman against Standley. 
C. \\'hether the district court erred in awarding Standley attorney fees and costs m 
defending the claims asserted by DeGroot. 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
'Vhether attorney fees on appeal should be awarded to Standley. 
Standley respectfully submits that DeGroot's statement of Issues on Appeal are 
insufficient, incomplete or raise additional issues as it fails to address recovery by Standley of its 
attorney fees on appeal. Standley therefore requests its attorney fees and costs associated with 
defending against this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54(d) and 54(e), LA.R. 35(b)(5) and 41, and all other applicable state law. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STAKDLEY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEGROOT'S 
AFFIRMATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST STANDLEY STATED IN THE 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
1. Standard of Review. 
On a motion for SUJ11..mary judgment "[a]ll disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 
Idaho 443, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003) citing In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 
1100 (2002). If the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. j1cCoy v. Lyons. 120 
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Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). Summary judgment is "appropriate if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Id. If "the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a 
question oflaw remains, over which [the court] exercises free review." Id. 
If the defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists with regard to an element of the plaintiffs case, the plaintiff must establish 
the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272-73, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). In order to forestall summary 
judgment in that case, the plaintiff must do more than present a scintilla of evidence; the plaintiff 
must submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact and 
that judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate. Petricel'ich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 
Idaho 865, 87l, 452 P.2d 362 (1969); G & _M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 
808 P.2d 851 (1991). 
Summary judgment must be entered when a nonmoving party fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that 
party \vill bear the burden of proof at trial. "In such a situation, there can be no 'genuine issue as 
to any material fact' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex C01P. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 956, 842 
P.2d 288 (CtApp. 1992). 
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2. DeGroot is not a third-party beneficiarY of Standlev's bid to Reitman. 
Standley prevailed against DeGroot's claims in the initial litigation due to the lack of 
contractual privity between DeGroot and Standley. DeGroot, as owner of the dairy project 
contracted with Beltman, the general contractor for the project. DeGroot agrees that he did not 
have a direct contractual relationship with Standley.43 Absent direct contractual privity, DeGroot 
looks to the bid contract between Standley and Beltman as the source document for which 
DeGroot was to be an intended beneficiary. DeGroot cites statutory law in support of his 
proposition, which provides: 
I.e. §29-102. 
Enforcement by beneficiary. A contract, made expressly for the 
benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time 
before the parties thereto rescind it. 
However, interpretation of the contract must by necessity occur before leaping to a 
conclusion as to whether or not a third party was intended to benefit from the contract. 
Standley's bid contract to Beltman should be reviewed within the familiar rules of contract 
interpretation, i.e., if the contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination of the contract's 
meaning and legal effect are questions of law and the intent of the parties is to be detennined 
from the plain meaning of the contract's wording. City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity, 126 
Idaho 604, 888 P.2d 383 (1995). A question of fact over the interpretation of the contract only 
arises when the contract is deemed ambiguous. !d. The bid contract is not ambiguous. The bid 
contract clearly outlines the job, materials and pricing that Standley "bid" to Beltman. The only 
reference whatsoever to the name "DeGroot" occurs on the first page of the bid contract as a 
43 R. Vol. L p. 172 
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reference to the project name.44 The bid contract contains no wording VI-hatsoever to the effect 
that Charles DeGroot, Eamest DeGroot, or DeGroot Farms, LLC are to be deemed as 
beneficiaries of Standley's bid to Beltman.45 
In order for DeGroot to recover on a third party beneficiary claim, it must be shown that 
the bid contract was made for DeGroot's direct benefit and no recover can be made if DeGroot is 
merely an incidental beneficiary. Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331,372 P.2d 414 (1962). 
Because the bid contract is relied upon by DeGroot for authority to recover as a third party 
beneficiary, the bid contract must be strictly construed in favor of Standley, i.e., the person 
against whom liability is asserted. Id., at pp. 337,418 This Court has held that, "the test for 
determining a party's status as a third-party beneficiary is whether the agreement reflects an 
intent to benefit the third party." Partout v. Halper, 145 Idaho 683,183 P.3d 771 (2008); citing, 
Idaho Pov.'er Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 112,90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004). 
A plain reading of the bid contract fails to show any intent to benefit DeGroot. The mere 
indication stated on the bid contract that the bid is being made in regard to the "DeGroot Dairy" 
identifies the job and does not expressly state any intent by Standley or Beltman that DeGroot is 
to expressly benefit from the sub-contractor's bid contract to the general contractor. Despite 
DeGroot's assertions to the contrary, "the intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in 
the contract itself. Idaho Power Co. 140 Idaho at 112,90 P.3d at 337; quoting Adkison COlp. v. 
American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341,344 (1984). In P artoUf, this Court noted 
that, "Partout fails to point to any specific written contract or to set forth the terms of an oral 
"4 R. Vol. 4. pp. 604-607 
45 Id. 
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contract showing an intent that the contract benefit Partout." ld, at pp. 687, 775. Here, DeGroot 
can only point to identification of the "DeGroot Dairy" being written on Standley's bid contract. 
There is no other wording within the bid contract upon which DeGroot can ground his third party 
beneficiary claim. In Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 97 P.3d 439 (2004), a lender 
involved with parties developing real property required personal guarantees by the principals for 
the developers. The contract stated that the personal guarantees were to "' ... payoff M&D Trust 
.... " ld. at pp. 446, 579. Despite the party being expressly identified and a purpose given for the 
personal guarantees to payoff that party, this Court denied the allegation of third party 
beneficiary status stating, " ... under the clear terms of the agreement M&D was not an intended 
beneficiary of any promise on the part of Thomas and Clegg." Jd. 
Further, the Idaho Court of Appeals has squarely addressed the issue of whether a project 
ovmer directly benefits from a contract, or merely has an incidental benefit in the contract 
between a sub contractor and the general contractor. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 
702, 99 P .3d 1092 (Ct. App. 2004). References to the "DeGroot Dairy" on the bid contract or on 
invoicing from the job show nothing more than DeGroot being an incidental beneficiary of the 
Standley - Beltman contract. Similarly, the fact that materials purchased by the subcontractor 
that went into construction of a cabin on land ovmed by Nelson, did not create a direct third party 
beneficial interest for the owner, Nelson, in the contract between the subcontractor and the 
general contractor. Jd. Identifying the owner by name in the bid contract or on invoicing 
documents for the job fails to meet the requirements of Idaho law for establishment of a third 
party beneficiary interest for DeGroot. The district court found the Nelson decision citations to 9 
Corbin on Contracts §779D (1979) and to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §302. illus. 19 
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(1981) dispositive on the point of law that a project O\\'l1er has no direct cause of action against a 
sub-contractor, " ... in the absence of clear words to the contrary. ,,46 Further, DeGroot cites no 
authority for the proposition that the manure handling equipment was under warranty and 
Standley's performing warranty work somehow creates a third party beneficiary interest for 
DeGroot in the Standley-Beltman contract. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to 
Standley on the third party beneficiary claim should be upheld. 
3. DeGroot cannot maintain warranty claims against Standley as the 
parties were never in a contractual relationship. 
Express \Varranties. 
Idaho's version of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
28-2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, 
Description, Sample. - (1) Express warranties by the seller are 
created as follows: 
(a) i\ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods 
shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made pa..'1:y of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods 
shall COnfOffi1 to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that 
46 March L 2005 hearing, pp. 66 - 68; citing, Nelson at pp. 709, 1099 for the propositions that: (1) The 
OVI'l1er is neither a creditor beneficiary nor a donee beneficiary: the benefit that he receiYes from 
perfonnance must be regarded as merely incidentaL 9 Corbin on Contracts §779D ( 979) and (2) A 
contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts with A to supply lumber needed for the building. C 
is an incidental beneficiary of B's promise. and B is an incidental beneficiary of C's promise to pay A 
for the building. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302, illus. 19 (1981). 
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the seller use fonnal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or 
that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an 
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement 
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of 
the goods does not create a warranty. 
Despite affinnation that no contract existed between DeGroot and Standley, DeGroot 
argues that Standley made express warranties to DeGroot regarding the manure handling system. 
Paragraph 41 of DeGroot's Second Amended Complaint is the only allegation set forth in the 
pleadings suggesting the creation of an express warranty. The further suggestion that no contract 
need be required in order to create an express warranty is contradicted by the statutory language 
requiring that an express warranty under Idaho's codification of the DCC must be "part of the 
basis of the bargain." In the context of personal injury damages, "DCC warranties apply only to 
those in privity of contract with the manufacturer and those who qualify as third party 
beneficiaries of the underlying sales contract, as defmed by I.C. §28-2-318." Puckett v. 
Oakfabco, Inc. 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1998); citing, Oats v. "Vissal1_~1otor Corp. in USA, 
126 Idaho 162, 169,879 P.2d 1095,1102 (1999). 
Although DeGroot does not seek personal mJury damages, the statute is explicit 
regarding how a seller creates an express \varranties. It would make little commercial sense to 
permit a cause of action by a buyer against a seller for an express warranty in the absence of a 
contract. Further, the comments to I.C. §28-2-313 \vould not discuss the policy considerations 
between allowing for the creation of express warranties versus the ability to contractually 
disclaim said \varranties, if privity of contract between buyer and seller were not a prerequisite 
for assertion of an express warranty. Jensen v. Seigel c'1ohile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668 
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P.2d 65 (1983); citing, Official COlmnent 4 to I.e. §28-2-313. If there is no contract, there can 
be no "basis of the bargain" upon which the alleged express \varranty was created. 
Further analysis of statements made by Standley employees, occurring at trade fairs years 
prior to construction of the dairy, or at the dairy after completion of construction and start-up of 
dairy operations, are not determinative of whether DeGroot can maintain a breach of express 
warranty against Standley. "The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that an express warranty 
arises only because the warrantor has willed it into being by making the requisite affirmation as 
part of the contract to which it is an adjunct." Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Williams-
Hayward Protective Coatings, Inc., 2005 WL782698, (N.D. Ill. Eastern Div.), 57 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv.2d 136; citing, Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 508-09, 127 Ill. Dec. 5, 532 
N .E.2d 834 (Ill. 1988). As the Illinois court noted in Canadian Pacific Railway Co., "in general, 
because an express warranty is a creature of contract a party must have privity to the contract 
before bringing a breach of express warranty claim." Id. Here, because of the lack evidence 
offered by DeGroot that Standley did anything that became a basis of a bargain, the proper 
analysis begins and ends with privity of contract. DeGroot admits that there was no contract 
with Standley and that Standley was a subcontractor for Beltman on the dairy project. For the 
reasons discussed supra, DeGroot is not a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract 
made to Beltman. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim 
for breach of express warranty should be upheld. 
Implied warranties. 
DeGroot assigns as an issue on appeal whether summary judgment was property granted 
by the district court below on the claims made against Standley for breach of the implied 
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warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. DeGroot cites to I.e. §28-2-
314(1) for the proposition that an implied warranty of merchantability arises in a sale of goods 
unless excluded or modified by the parties to the sale. As to the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, the statute provides: 
Implied \Varranty - Fitness for particular purpose. - v,'here the 
seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is 
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable 
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section, 
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
I.e. §28-2-315. 
However, the correct analysis centers on whether DeGroot can make a proper claim 
directly against Standley upon the implied warranty or merchantability or fitness for a particular 
purpose. The answer is no. The reason is that Idaho law is clear that privity of contract is 
necessary to maintain a contract action to recover for economic loss arising from breach on an 
implied warranty. Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1999). 
The facts of the Ramerth case are analogous to this appeal. Morris, the owner of an 
airplane, hired Hart to overhaul the aircraft's engine. !d. at p. 850, 196 Morris later sold the 
airplane to Ramerth. Id. Ran1erth did not know Hart and never had any business connections or 
dealings with him. Id. at 851, 197. After Ramerth purchased the airplane he discovered that 
Hart's overhaul work was defective and caused damage to both the airplane's engine and air 
frame. !d. at p. 850, 196. Ramerth and Morris jointly agreed to pursue an action against Hart. 
Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to Hart because Ramerth's breach of contract 
claim lacked privity of contract. Id. Morris then assigned his claims against Hart to Ramerth. 
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Id. Hart eventually obtained complete summary judgment on all claims. Id. On appeal, Morris 
and Ramerth argued that the requirement of privity of contract in breach of implied warranty 
actions should be abolished. Id. 
This court noted that Morris did not have any damages he could claim arising from Hart's 
overhaul of the engine, as the plane worked satisfactorily during his ownership and the 
malfunction occurred after he sold it to Ramerth. Similarly, Beltman has no damages to claim 
arising from Standley's work on the DeGroot dairy as Beltrnan was paid in full by DeGroot, 
including the work performed by Standley.47 Even in settling the DeGroot action against it, 
Beltman did not have to pay any actual monetary amount.48 Thus, analogous to Ramerth, even if 
Standley breached its bid contract with Beltman, Beltman incurred no actual damages and 
therefore, by assignment to DeGroot, Beltman conveyed no compensable loss to DeGroot. 
DeGroot has no contractual privity with Standley. 
DeGroot like Ramerth, argues that the requirement of contractual privity should be 
abolished in an action upon a contract to recover economic loss for breach of implied walTanties. 
In Ramerth, the history of the contractual privity requirement in Idaho jurisprudence was set 
forth, complete with reference to those instances over the past 30+ years where the doctrine was 
questioned but never abolished. The doctrine remains part of Idaho's jurisprudence and its stare 
decisis value should not be set aside. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley 
on DeGroot's implied warranty theories should be upheld. 
4" R., Vol. 5, pp. 796; 879 - 888 
48 ld 
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4. DeGroot cannot maintain a claim for breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing against Standley. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant in contract, not tort, 
from which only contractual damages can be asserted. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods. Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991). In paragraph 60 of the Second Amended 
Complaint, DeGroot alleges that Standley violated, nullified, and/or significantly impaired the 
benefits provided to DeGroot under contractual relationship and thus materially breached its 
implied obligations to act in good faith towards DeGroot.49 As argued supra, Charles DeGroot 
admitted that he did not have a contract with Standley. Thus, in the absence of contract, there 
can be no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Huyett v. Idaho State University, 
140 Idaho 904,952, 104 P.3d 946, 910 (2004), holding, "the university could not have breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to a non-existent contract." 
DeGroot did not contest the fact that no contract between the parties existed, but asserted 
that as a third party beneficiary, DeGroot could recover under the implied covenant, yet cited to 
no authority for such a proposition. 50 However, third party beneficiaries are only bound to the 
extent contract terms apply to him. Tolley v. Thi Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). 
Standley does not concede that its bid contract to Beltman was intended to directly benefit 
DeGroot, but merely analogizes to Idaho law illustrating how third party beneficiaries are limited 
when stating a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Lewis v. CEDU 
Educational Services, Inc., 135 Idaho 139,15 P.3d 1147 (2000). As argued supra, DeGroot, at 
best, was an incidental beneficiary of Standley's bid contract to Beltman. As an incidental 
49 R. Vol. 1, p. 73 
at p. 197 50 
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beneficiary only, DeGroot lacks third party beneficiary status and the claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails. Therefore, the granting of summary 
judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing should be upheld. 
5. DeGroot cannot maintain a claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act against Standley. 
Standley's arguments set forth belo'w in support of summary judgment on DeGroot's 
claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act are two-fold. First, due to the lack of a 
contractual sales transaction between the parties there wasn't anything that occurred between the 
parties that would be subject to the Act. Standley's second argument is that paragraph 66 of 
DeGroot's Second Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act, because the allegation contained therein did not meet the requisite 
element that the goods were of another quality of standard than represented. 51 A violation of the 
Act can only occur if " ... goods and services are represented to be of a particular quality and 
standard and, they are of another." In Re Edwards, 233 B.R. 461,471-76 (Bkrtcy. D. Ida. 1999). 
DeGroot's response was to agree that a contract is necessary for a claim under the Act, 
Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785,788,640 P.2d 1186 (Ct. App. 1982), and again assert that it was 
a third paIty beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to Beltman and that there is no Idaho 
authority on point as to whether a third party beneficiary can state a cause of action under the 
Act.52 On this issue, Standley continues to assert that DeGroot is not a third party beneficiary of 
its bid contract to Beltman, therefore DeGroot cannot state a claim for a yiolation of the Act. 
51 R \' 1 1 -''' -4' 1 '19 . . o. , pp. 1.)- / , k 
5: Jd., at pp. 198-199 
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However, DeGroot also argues that. even if it is not a third party beneficiary, it is still 
permissible to state a claim for violation of the Act because Standley attended trade shows and 
held itself out as having particular expertise and knowledge of Houle equipment. 53 
DeGroot cites no authority for its proposition that, absent a contract, a prospective 
buyer's attendance at a trade show and speaking to a vendor about equipment gives rise to an 
action under the Act. As argued by Standley, the problem with this assertion lies in the lack of 
proof as to what exactly was discussed between DeGroot and Standley at the trade show. Here, 
DeGroot failed to provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of his opposition to 
Standley's summary judgment. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act should be upheld. 
6. DeGroot has no contract upon which a claim of rescission against 
Standley can be made. 
The remedy of rescission under the U.e.C. is only available to a party to a contract. Here 
again, DeGroot's admission of no contract with Standley precludes recovery on this claim. Even 
the statutory definitions of "buyer" and "seller" under I.e. §28-2-201(1) contemplate a 
contractual relationship.54 DeGroot then resorts to the assertion that it purchased the manure 
handling equipment from Standley, an authorized dealer of Houle equipment. 55 This argument is 
analogous to DeGroot's third party beneficiary theory, as it is offered as a means to avoid the 
basic requirement that a contract exist between the parties before a proper claim is stated. As 
Standley argued before the district court, there is simply no evidence in the record establishing 
53 Id.. at p. 199 
54 Id., at p. 123; citing, I.e. §28-2-201(l) 
55 Id.. at p. 19] 
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that DeGroot made direct purchases of Houle equipment from Standley, i. e.: no purchase invoice 
and no proof of direct payment. 56 
Further missing from DeGroof s argument is the fact that the claim for rescission is 
subject to the EC.C. 's statute of frauds which provides: 
28-2-201. Formal requirements - Statute of Frauds. - (1) Except 
as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of 
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of 
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not 
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed 
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph 
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing. 
I.C. §28-2-201(l), emphasis added. 
As argued by Standley before the district court, DeGroot can't be a buyer in order to 
assert a right of rescission because there is no direct contract between them and in pursuing that 
line reasoning, DeGroot contradicts its position taken on all other issues on appeaL i.e., that it 
is a third party beneficiary of the Standley bid contract to Beltman. 
For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on DeGroot's claim for 
rescission of contract should be upheld. 
';6 Id "'60 • L •• at p. _) 
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B. THE ASSIGNMENT FROM BELTMAl'\f TO DEGROOT DOES NOT 
PROVIDE DEGROOT WITH THE SAME DAMAGES DEGROOT 
INITIALLY ALLEGED DIRECTLY AGAINST STANDLEY. 
1. Standard of Review. 
As Standley was granted complete summary judgment on the Beltman claims assigned to 
DeGroot, the standard of review set forth supra applies and need not be restated here. 
2. Introduction. 
LLiJ:ter DeGroot failed to prevail on the claims directly asserted against Standley, DeGroot 
settled its litigation against Beltman, took an assignment of Beltman's third party claims against 
Standley, and substituted into the litigation as a Third Party Plaintiff.57 It is important to note 
that the third party claims Beltman asserted against Standley and assigned to DeGroot are 
analogous to the original claims DeGroot attempted to directly assert against Standley. It is 
further important to note that in reaching settlement with DeGroot, Beltman (1) did not have to 
pay any monetary amount, and (2) DeGroot gave Beltman a Satisfaction of Judgment which \vas 
filed with the district court. 58 In terms of asserting damages, Beltman's damages cannot be the 
same as DeGroof s because Beltman operates a construction company and is not in the business 
of O\vning or operating a dairy; therefore, any special damages Beltman alleges to have incurred 
and passed to DeGroot by assignment, are not the same special damages DeGroot allegedly 
incurred. 59 Lastly, in regard to indemnity, Beltman never stated such a claim against Stanley in 
its Third Party Complaint or First Amended Third Party Complaint. 
57 R. Vol. 4, pp. 612-613; footnote #1, Order on Summary Judgment 
58 R. Vol. 5, p. 796: R. Vol. 3, pp. 525-526 
59 Regarding implied warranties, Beltman has not made a claim for the implied warranty of workmanlike 
performance against Standley for its work installing the manure handling equipment. Idaho has 
recognized this implied warranty. Hoffinal1 v. Simplot Aviation. Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 36, 539 P.2d 584, 
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3. Summar\' judgment was properly granted to Standlev on DeGroot's 
third party claim for breach of express warranty. 
The same statutory framework for creation of an express warranty, namely, I.e. §28-2-
313 discussed supra applies, the only distinction being that DeGroot is no longer attempting to 
assert a claim for breach of express warranty directly against Standley, but through assignment, 
steps into Beltman's shoes and asserts Beltman's claim, if any, for breach of express warranty 
against Standley. Standley argued before the district court that the purpose of the third party 
action was to allow the defendant (Beltman) in the first-party action to attempt to transfer its 
alleged liability to the plaintiff (DeGroot) on to the third-party defendant (Standley). The impact 
of the filing of a Satisfaction of Judgment arising from the settlement of the DeGroot claims 
against Beltman is dispositive because the Satisfaction of Judgment acts to satisfy any rights 
assigned by Beltman to DeGroot. 6o A contract made prior to judgment and then ruled on is 
reduced to the judgment, i.e., "when a contract has become merged in a valid judgment, all 
possibility of its revival is irretrievably lost." Tfloods v. Locke et al., 49 Idaho 486, 491-92, 289 
P.61O, 611 (1930). The filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment demonstrates that there are no 
damages in the third party case assigned from Beltman to DeGroot. 
Assuming arguendo, that the assignment from Beltman to DeGroot and subsequent 
Satisfaction of Judgment fail to establish that there are no damages in the third party case for 
DeGroot to pursue, the facts and law discussed herein regarding express walTanty still fail to 
accommodate the third party action. DeGroot, through assigmnent from Beltman, must 
demonstrate that Standley made affInnations of fact or promise to Beltman that became a basis 
60 
588 (1975). As Beltman did not state this claim, DeGroot did not acquire a claim for breach of the 
implied warranty of workmanlike performance through the assignment of Beltman' s claims. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 510 
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of the bargain between Standley and BeItman. A seller's commendation of the goods or 
statements as to value of the goods, as well as statements of puffery, are not express warranties. 
Jensen v. Siegel A10bile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189,668 P.2d 65 (1983); I.e. §28-2-313(2). 
DeGroot, standing in B e Itm an , s shoes, can only reference two items in support of the 
contention that Standley made express warranties about the manure handling equipment and 
installation. First are statements attributed to a Standley employee made to Earnest DeGroot 
concerning maintenance of the system, but these statements occurred after the bid contract had 
been accepted and after the equipment had been installed at the dairy.6l Second are statements 
attributed to Kurt Standley made to Charles DeGroot at a trade show in Tulare, California in 
1999.62 These statements did not become a basis of the bargain because neither were made by 
Standley to BeItman, were not made at or around the time of contracting, and were made after 
completion of installation of the equipment. Even if DeGroot had established that the statements 
were in fact made, there is no evidence that the statements 'were more than mere puffery. 
A buyer carries the burden of proof to establish the existence of facts that give rise to an 
express warranty; a buyer also must carry the burden of proof that there was a breach of an 
express warranty.63 BeItman lacks facts to establish that Standley made express warranties about 
the manure handling equipment or the installation of the equipment. Through assignment, 
DeGroot received nothing better factually than what existed when DeGroot directly asserted a 
breach of express warranties against Standley. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to 
61 R. Vol. 5, p. 798 
62 ]d., at p. 799; see also, R. Vol. 2, p. 213 
63ICS::')8')~1'" l "Ad UCC[\,)~1"·"")')')[\')"1"2·'6.::;("rdEd) . . ~._ -",--.) .), see a so.) . n erson . . . ;:,":'-.) L) .k~",-, ::,~-j .J.':' _.) . 
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Standley on Beltman's third party claim for breach of express warranty, assigned to DeGroot, 
should be upheld. 
4. Summary judgment was properly granted to Standley on DeGroot's 
third party claim for breach of implied warranties. 
It is problematic for DeGroot that the district court's ruling on summary judgment on the 
third party claims was premised on the finding that DeGroot's causes of action (received through 
assignment from Beltman) were never liquidated. Damages were never liquidated because there 
was never a finding of fault against Beltman on DeGroot's claims and causes of action. Nor was 
there any determination of apportionment of fault between Beltman and Standley on Beltman's 
claims and causes of action. The causes of action were never liquidated because there was never 
a finding apportioning fault between Beltman and Standley.64 DeGroot steps in to Beltman's 
shoes through the assignment obtained from Beltman; however, if liquidated damages provide 
the soles for those shoes, DeGroot's bare feet are touching the ground. 
DeGroot argues that Beltman relied upon Standley's expertise for installation of the 
manure handling system and that this reliance precludes summary judgment for Standley on the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 65 DeGroot does not devote any further 
authority or argument to the implied warranty of merchantability in the context of Beltman's 
assignment of that cause of action and DeGroot has therefore waived the implied warranty of 
merchantability. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). DeGroot also overlooks 
the fact that Charles DeGroot told Beltman to use Standley as the sub-contractor for the manure 
handling equipment thus, Beltman did as instructed and did not unilaterally select Standley for 
64 October 21,2011 hearing, pp. 97-99: Appellant's Brief, p. 27 
65 Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-31 
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the job based upon Standley's experience or expertise. Beltman, as a buyer under the U.C.c., 
did not rely upon Standley, rather DeGroot told Beltman to use Standley. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 1011, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995) (no implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose where there was no evidence that the buyer relied on the seller's 
judgment to select appropriate goods for a particular purpose). 
DeGroot looks to the assigned claims from Beltman in an attempt to boot strap itself into 
an exception to the vertical privity rule when seeking economic loss on a breach of implied 
warranty. In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F.Supp.2d 659, (N.D. Ill. 2005), a similar 
argument was made by a buyer and addressed by the federal district court.66 Caterpillar used 
steel manufactured by Usinor for heavy duty dump truck bodies, the steel proved to be defective 
for the specified use, and Caterpillar initiated litigation which, in part, alleged breaches of 
express and implied warranties regarding the steel. 67 Caterpillar lacked vertical contractual 
privity with Usinor.68 Caterpillar argued that an exception to the contractual privity rule existed 
because it gave Usinor specifications for its truck bodies and because Usinor was aware of 
Caterpillar's uses and requirements for the stee1.69 
In addressing Caterpillar's arguments for exception to the rule of contractual privity the 
federal district court questioned whether such an exception even continued to exist under Illinois 
law and when addressing the merits of Caterpillar's argument noted that its Complaint failed to 
66 The Illinois commercial code statute for implied warranties, 810 ILCS 5/2-315, (fomlerly cited as IL 
ST CH 26 ~2-3 1 5) reads identically to I.e. §28-2-315. 
67 Jd., at p. 663 
~8 
o Jd., at p. 676 
69 Jd. 
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state that Usinor custom made the steel specifically for Caterpillar. 7o The court made this 
distinction because the line of authority relied upon by Caterpillar for exception to contractual 
privity contains a, " ... common thread ... that the buyer told the manufacturer of its needs before 
the product \vas built.,,71 The court noted, "here it \vas the other \vay around: Caterpillar told 
Usinor what it needed after Usinor told Caterpillar about the properties of ti"'1e ... steel in the 
1998 and 2000 sales presentations." 72 The court further noted that, "Caterpillar does not allege 
that after it gave Usinor the specifications, Usinor specifically designed the (steel) that it sold to 
CMSA and Westech for use in the truck bodies. . .. U sinor appears to have provided a mere 
component to CMSA and We stech: it was CMSA and Westech who designed a finished product 
for Caterpillar, not U sinor." 73 
Applying the Caterpillar facts to Beltman's claims assigned to DeGroot, Beltman did not 
allege that Houle custom made the manure handling equipment for the DeGroot dairy project or 
even that Standley informed Houle of special custom requirements for the equipment to be 
installed at the DeGroot dairy. Nor does Beltman allege that it gave Standley specifications and 
that Standley specifically designed the manure handling system. Charles DeGroot testified that 
Beltman did not even provide the plans for the dairy because DeGroot had earlier obtained the 
plans from Vance Construction, the design-build contractor who did not get the job. 74 Standley, 
analogous to Usinor in the Caterpillar case, provided a mere component to Beltman in the form 
70 Jd. 
71 Jd. 
-~ ld. 
I~ ld. 
,4 R. Vol. 1, p. 101; R. Vol. 2, p. 209 
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of the equipment manufactured by Houle and the installation of that equipment at the DeGroot 
dairy. 
Beltman's claim for breach of implied warranty, assigned to DeGroot, fails because 
(1) Beltman' s damages were never liquidated, thus through the assignment DeGroot did not 
receive anything upon which to recover damages against Standley, and (2) Beltman has not come 
forward with any evidence more than a mere scintilla upon which to support its claim that it 
relied upon Standley's experience and expertise for the purchase and installation of the manure 
handling equipment at the DeGroot dairy. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to 
Standley on Beltman's third party claim for breach of the implied covenant of fitness for a 
particular purpose, assigned to DeGroot, should be upheld. 
5. Summary judgment was properly granted to Standlev on DeGroot's 
third party claim for rescission of contract. 
DeGroot's attempt to bring a direct claim against Standley for rescission failed due to 
lack of contractual privity. DeGroot then took an assignment from Beltman on Beltman's third 
party claim stated against Standley for rescission. Although DeGroot argues the law of 
rescission when addressing DeGroot's failed attempt to make a direct claim against Standley, in 
the assignment of the third party claim, DeGroot's argument focuses upon laches and does not 
attempt to apply the fact to the law regarding rescission. 
Pursuant to I.e. §28-2-603 a buyer may revoke acceptance of goods if the non-
conformity of the goods substantially impairs their value, and if the buyer has accepted the goods 
on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured and it has not seasonably 
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been cured. 75 Acceptance can only be revoked within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers 
or should have discovered the ground for the revocation. 76 A buyer rejects non-conforming 
goods by taking affirmative action to avoid acceptance and by notifying the seller of the rejection 
within a reasonable time. 77 
Through Standley's bid contract to Beltman, the parties contracted for the purchase/sale 
and installation of the manure handling equipment at the DeGroot dairy therefore meeting the 
definitional requirements under the D.e.C. for "buyer" and "seller." In the context of Beltman's 
third party claim for rescission against Standley, the district court held that the claim of 
rescission was not brought in a timely manner. The claim of rescission that is relevant is not 
DeGroot's notice to Standley in June, 2001, as the letter conveying that notice was for DeGroot's 
direct claim for rescission against Standley. 78 The basis for the district cOUli's holding focuses 
upon notice, if any, given by Beltman to Standley for rescission of Standley'S bid contract. 
DeGroot argues that "Beltman asserted its claim for rescission against Standley," but fails to cite 
to anything in the record substantiating this proposition. 79 It is dispositive that Beltman's Third 
Party Complaint was filed nearly five years after completion of the DeGroot dairy and Beltman 
made no attempt, in writing or otherwise, to notify Standley of a rescission of Standley's bid 
contract prior to filing its Third Party Complaint. 
Lacking is any evidence of Beltman taking affirmative action to avoid acceptance, and by 
notifying the seller of the rejection within a reasonable time, as required by I.e. §28-2-618. This 
75 I.e. §28-2-603(l)(a); Beal v. Grifjin, 123 Idaho 445, 449,849 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1993). 
76 I.e. §28-2-608(2) 
-r-; 
LC. §28-2-608 
78 R. Vol. 2, pp. 343-349 
79 Appellant's Brief, p. 3 1 
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is the basis for the district court's holding that the claim for rescission was not brought within a 
reasonable time. 8o Contrary to Appellant's assertions, the laches argument initially advanced by 
Standley is not the same argument used later when Standley again sought summary judgment on 
BeItman's rescission claim assigned to DeGroot. Therefore, the granting of slLmmary judgment 
to Standley on BeItman's third party claim for rescission of contract, assigned to DeGroot, 
should be upheld. 
6. Summary judgment was properlY granted to Standley on DeGroot's 
third party claim for breach of the implied coyenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
BeItman's third party action against Standley included a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The claim was assigned by BeItman to DeGroot, but the 
analysis requires application of facts to law concerning the dealings between BeItman and 
Standley in order to determine whether DeGroot obtained any viable claim through assignment. 
As Standley argued before the district COlIli, a violation of the covenant occurs only when a party 
violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. 81 Idaho First Nat 'I. Bank 
v. Bliss Valley Food, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841 (1991). Beltman has presented no 
evidence on Standley'S conduct which allegedly violated, nullified, or significantly impaired any 
benefit BeItman was to receive as a resuIt of Standley'S bid contract. The undisputed facts show 
that Beltman was paid in full on its contract with DeGroot and that no benefit of the 
BeltnwnlStandley contract was nullified or significantly impaired. In fact, Beltman was not 
required to return any money to DeGroot and DeGroot never requested that Beltman return any 
80 Appellant's Brief. p. 3 L September 7, 2011 Motion for Summary Judgment. pp.70-71 
81 R. Vol. 5, p. 779 
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monetary amount. 82 Nor did DeGroot retain any money from Beltman as a result of Standley's 
work installing the manure handling equipment. 83 
The stipulated judgment Beltman entered into with DeGroot resolving the litigation 
DeGroot brought against Beltman also fails to yield a basis upon which Beltman can claim that 
its contract with Standley was violated, nullified or significantly impaired due to the lack of any 
monetary amount being paid by Beltman to DeGroot. Beltman has testified that it is not out any 
money as a result of Standley's conduct, or as a result of the functioning of the manure handling 
equipment. 84 Beltman has failed to rebut Standley's motion for summary judgment due to the 
lack of evidence of violation, nullification or significant impainnent of Beltman' s expectations 
under the Standley bid contract. Further, on appeal, DeGroot has waived this issue by failing to 
provide authority or argument specifically supporting the validity of Beltman's third party claim 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which it took by way of assignment. 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). 
Therefore, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on Beltman's third party claim 
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, assigned to DeGroot, should be upheld. 
7. SummarY judgment was properlv granted to Standley on DeGroot's 
third partv claim for indemnification. 
On September 7, 2011, the district court heard oral argun1ent on Standley'S motion for 
partial sUll1illary judgment and motion in limine. 85 Standley's partial summary judgment 
addressed the DeGroot third party claims obtained from Beltman through assigmnent for breach 
s- Td 79') - 11 ., at p., ~ 
8~ Td 79-. 11 ., at p.! ) 
84 T ' 796 la., at p. , 
85 September 7, 20 I 1 hearing, pp. 1-80 
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of express warranty, breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim for rescission. 86 
Beltman never stated a claim for indemnity against Standley. Standley's motion in limine was 
filed as a formality to confirm the district court's prior rulings that DeGroot could not maintain 
direct causes of action against Standley, thereby seeking to prohibit the introduction of any 
evidence irrelevant to the then remaining claims DeGroot obtained from Beltman through 
assignment. 87 During oral argument on the motion in limine, the issue arose as to whether 
Beltman's claims against Standley constituted a claim for indemnity arising from Beltman's 
relationship with DeGroot and the parties requested additional briefing on the indenmity issue. 88 
The remedy of indenmity can arise expressly by contract, be implied from contract, or 
arise through the common law. Here, Standley's bid contract to BeItman does not contain an 
express written provision for contractual indemnity. Nor can contractual indenmity be implied 
from Standley's bid contract to Beltman. If a claim for indeITL'lity was possessed by Beltman, it 
must arise from the common law as an equitable remedy. 
Indenmity between tortfeasors has been defined as: 
(1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third for the same harm 
and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to 
indenmity from the other for if the other would be unjustly 
enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability .... 
Restatement (Second) Torts §886B, Indenmity Between Tortfeasors, 1979, emphasis added 
Restitution is the basis for equitable indenmity. Id., at Comment C; see also, Chenery v. 
Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 766 P.2d 751 (1988). The distinction between contribution 
86 R \" 1 - ~'O . 10.), p. / I 
go 
Id., at pp. 862-965 
88 Id., at p. 891 
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and indemnity has also been clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court's characterization to think of 
indemnity as a claim for 100% reimbursement, while contribution is for partial reimbursement. 
Chenel)i, at p. 284, 754, citing, Stephenson v. ~McClure, 606 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Mo. App. 
1980).89 In order for equitable indemnity to apply, DeGroot must be able to show that both 
Beltman and Standley are liable in tort to DeGroot for the same harm. DeGroot can't make this 
threshold showing, as the law of the case has established that there are no direct (contract based) 
claims against Standley, nor has DeGroot stated a claim for negligence directly against Standley. 
In addition, DeGroot can't meet the sho\ving of unjust enrichment. Beltman's discharge of the 
liability alleged by DeGroot against it did not unjustly enrich Standley, as DeGroot could not 
maintain any direct claims or causes of action against Standley for the reasons set f011h supra. 90 
Even though DeGroot can't make the threshold shov,ling, further argument and authority is 
provided on equitable indemnity. The prima facie elements are: (1) an indemnity relationship, 
(2) actual liability of an indem .. nitee to the third party, and (3) a reasonable settlement amount. 
Chene/y, at 284, 754; citing, Williams v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 292, 442 P.2d 178 (1968). "An 
indemnity relationship betvveen tortfeasors exists when the parties share a common liability for 
the same harm." .. Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 858 P.2d 822 (et. App. 1993); citing, 
Restatement (Second) Torts §886B, (1979). DeGroot must point to a common liability for the 
same hann that Beltman shared with Standley. The record is clear, Beltman does not assel1 any 
damages different from DeGroot's damages. The damages BeItman seeks derive directly from 
DeGroot's contractual damages against Beltman. Beltman does not have any damages in excess 
89 Indemnity is also distinguished from subrogation, see, R. Vol 5, p. 895, !viay Trucking v. International 
Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319, 32 L 543 P .2d ]159,1161 (1975). 
90 See also footnote #3, R. Vol. 5. p. 896 
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of DeGroot's and DeGroot's ability to make a direct claim against Standley fails due to the lack 
of privity of contract. Thus, the assignment to DeGroot of Beltman's claims against Standley 
fails to convey a common liability between Beltman and Standley arising from the dairy project. 
The second element of actual liability of the indemnitee (Beltman) to the third party 
(DeGroot) does not exist, as Beltman never paid, nor will it ever pay, any monetary amount to 
DeGroot. 91 Beltman will never have to pay DeGroot, due to the satisfaction of judgment it 
received from DeGroot. Issuance of a satisfaction of judgment, " ... ends the case and dismisses 
the parties from the jurisdiction of the court." Dahlstrom v. Featherstone, 18 Idaho 179, 11 0 P. 
243 (1910). 
The third element of a "reasonable settlement amount" is also mlssmg, preventing 
DeGroot from obtaining equitable indemnity through assignment of Beltman's claims against 
Standley. The record shows DeGroot's position to be: 
Here, Beltman is not asserting it is entitled to damages in excess of 
DeGroot's damages and Standley camlOt seriously argue 
othervv-ise. The damages Beltman seeks, including damages 
relating to repair costs, system improvement costs and future repair 
costs, derive directly from DeGroot's contractual claims against 
Beltman. 
R. Vol. 5, p. 839; Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant Standley Trenching, Inc.' s Motion in 
Limine, p.3. 
As DeGroot admits that Beltman has no independent damage claims against Standley, the 
only reasonable settlement amount of Beltman's claims against Standley is $0. As Beltman did 
not pay, nor will ever pay any amount to DeGroot, the stipulated amount benNeen the parties is 
91 Id. at p. 897, for further references in the record supporting why Beltman has no actual liability as 
indelllilitee to DeGroot as a third party. 
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fictitious. Beltman therefore was not acting in good faith making a settlement offer under a 
reasonable belief that it was necessary to its protection. This is llilother reason why equitable 
indemnity is unavailable to Beltman and why DeGroot did not receive a cognizable claim 
through the assignment of Beltman's claims against Standley. 
Lastly, DeGroot looks to the third party practice in the litigation below as a means to 
justify the end result that Beltman has no damages in excess of DeGroot's damages, or that 
Beltman's risk of paying damages did not arise until DeGroot sued it.92 LR.C.P. 14(a) provides: 
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a 
third-party plaintiff may cause to be served a sunm10ns and 
complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may 
be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. 
LR.C.P. 14(a), emphasis added. 
DeGroot further states that, " ... the very essence of third party pleading is that the third 
party defendant's liability be derivative of, or secondary to, that of the defendant in the main 
action.93 DeGroot sued Beltman and Beltman brought a third party action against Standley. The 
reference to "the third party defendant's liability" can only mean Standley. Standley'S liability 
must be derivative or secondary to Beltman's liability in the main action of DeGroot v. Beltman. 
However, Beltman's liability was never adjudicated to finality, nor did Beltman pursue its claims 
against Standley to finality. DeGroot seems to argue that LR.C.P. 14(a) allmys it to disregard 
that Beltman has no damages in excess of that claimed by DeGroot and the third party pleadings 
in effect become a conduit for another direct assertion by DeGroot of its damages claims against 
92 Appellant's Brief, p. 34 
O~ ld. 
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Standley. The definition of assignment has been the subject of review by the Idaho Supreme 
Court: 
"Assigmnent" is defined as "the transfer of rights or property." 
Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed. 1999). i\merican 
Jurisprudence, Second Edition, defines "assignment' as: 
... a transfer of property or some other right from one person (the 
'assignor') to another (the 'assignee'), which comers a complete 
and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. An 
assignment is a contract between the assi gnor and the assignee, and 
is interpreted or construed in accordance to rules of contract 
construction. Ordinarily, the word 'assigmnent' is limited in its 
application to a transfer of intangible rights, including contractual 
rights, choses in action, and rights in or connected with property, 
as distinguished from transfer of the property itself. According to 
the Restatement of Contracts, an assigmnent of a right is a 
manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of 
which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is 
extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to 
such perfonnance. 
Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho Stare Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 125-25,90 P.3d 346, 
351 (2007); citing, Black's Law Dictionary and 6 io\.l11.Jur.2d Assigmnent § 1 (1999). 
In order to detennine the intent of the assigmnent a court looks to the contract benveen 
the assignor and assignee. !d. at pp. 126, 351 Behman is designated as the assignor and DeGroot 
the assignee. 94 "An assignment of the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the 
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action. and the assignee becomes the real party in 
interest. "Jd., citing, McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289,291-92 (1973). 
Thus, only DeGroot, as assignee, can prosecute Beltman's claims, as assignor, against Standley. 
LR.C.P. 14(a) does not change the basic definitions or concept of assigmnent. The one-way 
94 R. Vol. 5, pp. 883 - 884 
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direction of the assignment that occUt"Ted in the litigation below is further supported by the 
following: 
To be effective, an assignment must be completed \vith a delivery, 
and the delivery must confer a complete and present right on the 
transferee. The assignor must not retain control over the property 
assigned, the authority to collect, or the power to revoke. 
ld., citing, 6 /\m.Jur.2d Assignment § 132 (1999). 
The fact Beltman doesn't assert any damages ill excess of DeGroof s, and that the 
damages have always been DeGroot's, conveys nothing to DeGroot to enforce against Standley 
pursuant to the assignment from Beltman. DeGroot, as assignee, can only assert Beltman's 
claims, as assignor. The assignment does not enable DeGroot to pursue its claims anew despite 
the lack of privity. For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment to Standley on 
DeGroot's third party claim for indemnification should be upheld. 
8. DeGroot cannot recover incidental or consequential damages through 
assignment of ReItman's third party claims against Standlev. 
DeGroot cites to I.e. §28-2-712(2), §28-2-713(1) and §28-2-715 in support of the 
argument that incidental and consequential damages are recoverable against Standley.95 
However, the "buyer" in reference to these provisions of Idaho's statutory codification of the 
u .C.C. is Beltman, not DeGroot, as DeGroot has no direct contractual causes of action against 
Standley due to lack of privity. Thus, through assignment of Beltman's third party claims, 
DeGroot must establish that Beltman incurred incidental and consequential damages. The 
special damages originally identified by DeGroot against Standley are not the same damages that 
Beltman allegedly possessed against Standley. The incidental and consequential damages cited 
95 Appellant's Brief at pp. 36-37 
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by DeGroot arose from DeGroot's claims originally asserted against Standley, which Beltman 
never possessed nor asserted against Standley. Therefore, the assigmnent from Beltman to 
DeGroot did not breathe new life into DeGroot's attempt to claim these alleged damages against 
Standley. 
C. STANDLEY WAS PROPERLY AWARDED ATTOR~EY FEES AND 
COSTS IN THE LITIGATION BELOW. 
DeGroot assigns error to the district court's awarding of attorney fees and costs to 
Standley, arguing that, if there is no privity of contract between DeGroot and Standley, it is 
patently unfair to then award Standley its fees and costs under I.e. §12-120(3).96 However, this 
question has been addressed and there is authority upon which an award of attorney fees and 
costs under I.e. 12-120(3) can be made in the absence of a contract when the case involved a 
commercial transaction. Blimka v. 1I1y Web FVholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594,599 
(2007). The lack of contractual privity does not prevent Standley, the prevailing party in the 
consolidated litigation below involving a commercial transaction, to be awarded its attorney fees 
pursuant to I.e. §12-120(3).97 
D. STANDLEY IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTOR~EY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Standley believes that it will prevail on the issues argued above and that it is entitled to 
its attorney's fees pursuant to I.e. §12-120(3) and I. A. R. 41. If summary judgment is upheld for 
Standley on (1) DeGroot's affirmative claims, (2) DeGroot's third party beneficiary claim, 
(3) DeGroot's third party claims against Standley received through assignment from Beltman, 
96 Appellant's Brief at p. 38 
97 R. Vol. 6, pp. 1106 - 1115 
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and (4) no basis for indemnity exists, then Standley will have prevailed, which would pennit it to 
recovery its attorney fees on appeal. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Standley respectfully requests this Court uphold the decisions 
of the district court as argued above. 
DATED this 11th day of April, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SASSER & INGLIS, P.e. 
By l \. j/IJ:tf),,~ /1:v'1/j/"v 
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